Private Provision of Public Goods Can be Efficient

Private Provision of Public Goods Can be Efficient
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Publisher :
Total Pages : 21
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ISBN-10 : OCLC:18334032
ISBN-13 :
Rating : 4/5 ( Downloads)

Book Synopsis Private Provision of Public Goods Can be Efficient by : Barton Lipman

Download or read book Private Provision of Public Goods Can be Efficient written by Barton Lipman and published by . This book was released on 1987 with total page 21 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt:

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