Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements, Dispute Settlement and Separation of Powers
Author | : Kristy Buzard |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 44 |
Release | : 2015 |
ISBN-10 | : OCLC:1308400613 |
ISBN-13 | : |
Rating | : 4/5 ( Downloads) |
Download or read book Self-Enforcing Trade Agreements, Dispute Settlement and Separation of Powers written by Kristy Buzard and published by . This book was released on 2015 with total page 44 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: In an environment where international trade agreements must be enforced via promises of future cooperation, the presence of an import-competing lobby has important implications for optimal punishments, and therefore dispute resolution procedures. When lobbies work to disrupt trade agreements, the optimal punishment must balance two, conflicting objectives. Longer punishments help to enforce cooperation by increasing the government's costs of defecting, but because the lobby prefers the punishment outcome, this also incentivizes lobbying effort and with it political pressure to break the agreement. Thus the model generates new predictions for the design of mechanisms for resolving trade disputes: within the class of Nash-reversion punishments, there is an optimal length for dispute resolutions procedures, and it depends directly on the political influence of the lobbies. Trade agreement tariffs are shown to be increasing in the political influence of the lobbies, as well as their patience levels.