Costly Information Acquisition in Decentralized Markets
Author | : Elena N. Asparouhova |
Publisher | : |
Total Pages | : 45 |
Release | : 2019 |
ISBN-10 | : OCLC:1304292083 |
ISBN-13 | : |
Rating | : 4/5 ( Downloads) |
Download or read book Costly Information Acquisition in Decentralized Markets written by Elena N. Asparouhova and published by . This book was released on 2019 with total page 45 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This study tests the rationality of the decisions to purchase information, the informational efficiency of prices, and the optimality of the resulting allocations with a series of laboratory experiments in decentralized markets. The theory predicts that markets with dispersed information and natural buyers and sellers converge to a fully revealing equilibrium. It is profitable to pay for information and as such, the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox does not emerge. Statistically significant improvements in both price efficiency and allocative efficiency are documented across trading periods. In contrast with centralized markets, participants in decentralized markets remain willing to pay for information in all replications.